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EPIC SYSTEMS CORP. V. LEWIS: INDIVIDUAL ARBITRATION 
AND THE FUTURE OF TITLE VII DISPARATE IMPACT AND 
PATTERN-OR-PRACTICE CLASS ACTIONS 
Carson E. Miller 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In May 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States overruled a recent 
precedent of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), and held that 
the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) does not provide a means to 
supersede the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in regard to agreements 
to individually arbitrate claims, and therefore waive class actions, in 
employment contracts.1 Since 2012, the NLRB had found the NLRA to 
void such class waivers due to the NLRA’s protections for employees 
engaged in activities for their “mutual aid or protection.”2  
Writing for the majority, Justice Gorsuch upheld a class waiver on the 
grounds that: (1) the FAA requires arbitration and class waiver 
agreements to be enforced unless the agreements are void under general 
contract grounds or a federal statute expressly overrides the FAA; (2) the 
NLRA does not expressly override the FAA, and does not provide a 
means to void such agreements under the NLRA; and (3) even if the 
NLRA concerned the FAA, the NLRB does not have the authority to 
interpret the FAA because the NLRB is only granted judicial deference to 
interpret the NLRA.3 The decision narrowed the NRLA’s scope, and 
effectively excluded employees from voiding class action waivers under 
the NLRA outside of a collective-bargaining context.4 
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg tried to limit the reach of the majority’s 
opinion: “I do not read the Court’s opinion to place in jeopardy [Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s] discrimination complaints asserting 
disparate-impact and pattern-or-practice claims that call for proof on a 
groupwide basis.”5 In support of this proposition, Justice Ginsburg argued 
that since some courts do not allow individual employees to bring Title 
VII pattern-or-practice and disparate impact claims alone, without further 
evidence of intentional discrimination, a class waiver on such claims 
unlawfully limits employees’ rights under Title VII.6 
 
 1. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018). 
 2. See D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012); see also 29 U.S.C.S. §157 (LexisNexis 
2018). 
 3. See generally, Epic Sys., 138 S.Ct. at 1612. 
 4. See id. at 1616-1617. 
 5. Id. at 1648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 6. See id. (citing Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y & N.J., 685 F.3d 135, 146-50 (2d Cir. 2012)). 
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This note seeks to evaluate Justice Ginsburg’s claim that—even 
assuming the validity of the Epic Systems decision—class action waivers 
are unenforceable against employees who bring pattern-or-practice and 
disparate impact claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
This note will first discuss the background statutes of the Epic Systems 
decision: the FAA and the NLRA. This note will next include a discussion 
of disparate impact and pattern-or-practice claims under Title VII, 
followed by a discussion of Epic Systems’ majority and dissenting 
opinions.  
Then, this note argues that Title VII’s plain language insufficiently 
discusses arbitration agreements or class action waivers to meet the Epic 
Systems’ standard of voiding an arbitration agreement under a federal 
statute other than the FAA. Under this analysis, class waivers are still 
likely to be upheld in pattern-or-practice and disparate impact claims, as 
such claims are likely to be considered methods of proof for Title VII 
claims, rather than substantive statutory rights at contract or law that 
could void the agreement. Finally, this note will analyze Justice 
Ginsburg’s argument that the unavailability of a class action disparate 
impact claim in individual arbitration effectively eliminate a substantive 
right under Title VII, and conclude that the argument insufficiently 
accounts for Epic Systems’ broad reliance on a statute’s plain language to 
override the FAA.  
II. BACKGROUND 
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis concerned arbitration agreements with 
class action waivers to prohibit employees’ wage and hour claims to be 
brought as a class action under the National Labor Relations Act.7 This 
section will discuss (1) the breadth and enforceability of arbitration 
agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act, (2) claims and enforcement 
under the National Labor Relations Act, (3) the origin and nature of 
disparate impact claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
and (4) Epic Systems. Within the discussion of Epic Systems, this section 
will examine both the majority’s reasons for upholding the arbitration 
agreement in that case, and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent and argument that 
the majority’s reasoning cannot apply to Title VII disparate impact 
claims.  
A. The Federal Arbitration Act  
The FAA was passed with the intent to broadly favor parties’ ability to 
 
 7. Id. at 1619-20. 
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contract, and to enforce agreements into which parties have entered. 8 To 
those ends, Section 2 of the FAA provides: 
A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of 
such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any 
part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing 
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be 
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.9 
By its plain language, the FAA mandates arbitration unless the party 
seeking to void the agreement makes a showing that there is some 
common-law or other statutory reason to void the agreement.10 Moreover, 
Section 3 of the FAA provides that, upon the presence of a valid 
arbitration agreement: 
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United 
States . . . the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied 
that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration 
under such agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the 
trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with 
the terms of the agreement.11 
Additionally, Section 2 creates a “body of federal substantive law of 
arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage 
of the [FAA].”12 In enacting Section 2, Congress made a national policy 
that favors arbitration and withdraws the power of the states to require 
judicial forum for claims in which the parties agreed to arbitrate.13 By 
giving the FAA the full scope of the Commerce Clause, Congress sought 
to preempt any substantive limitations by states on the effectiveness of 
arbitration clauses.14 In Perry v. Thomas, the Court distinguished between 
federal statutory arbitration exemptions and state laws that exempt parties 
from arbitration, and held that the Supremacy Clause preempts such 
attempts by the states.15 The case involved a dispute over commissions on 
the sale of securities, where a former employee refused to submit to 
arbitration on the grounds that California law specifically allowed 
 
 8. S. Elec. Health Fund v. Kelley, 308 F. Supp. 2d 847, 852 (M.D. Tenn. 2003) (quoting Dean 
Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985)). 
 9. 9 U.S.C.S. § 2 (LexisNexis 2018) (emphasis added). 
 10. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 218 (e.g. fraud, unconscionability, etc.). 
 11. 9 U.S.C.S. § 3 (LexisNexis 2018). 
 12. Fox Int’l Rels. v. Fiserv Secs., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 2d 718, 722 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (quoting Moses 
H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).  
 13. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 
11-12 (1984)). 
 14. Id. at 490-91. 
 15. Id. at 491. 
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employees to maintain actions for wages despite the existence of an 
arbitration agreement.16 The Court reasoned that since the FAA provided 
for a broad, federal policy of arbitration, contracts that are a part of 
interstate commerce are subject to the FAA, which preempts state 
limitations on arbitration.17 
Even common-law contractual reasons for voiding arbitration 
agreements may be difficult to litigate.18 In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood 
& Conklin Mfg. Co., the parties entered into a consulting agreement with 
a broad arbitration clause which provided that “any controversy or claim 
arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be 
settled by arbitration.”19 When one party alleged that the contract was 
induced by fraud and tried to void the arbitration clause of the contract 
wholesale, the Court had to determine whether a fraud claim on the 
contract itself had to be referred to arbitration or could remain in federal 
court.20 Reasoning that the FAA intended to broadly enforce arbitration 
agreements, and that while the district court could consider the fraudulent 
nature of the arbitration clause itself, the Court held that the issue of fraud 
as a barrier to contract enforcement had to be referred to arbitration.21 
Since the FAA created a federal substantive policy for arbitration, the 
FAA has been applied broadly to many areas of federal law, even those 
that provide private rights of action.22 When a party seeks to void an 
arbitration agreement to enforce a federal statutory right, the burden is 
placed on that party to show congressional intent to have that claim heard 
in a judicial forum.23 Absent plain language to the contrary, this can be an 
exceptionally difficult burden to meet; arbitration agreement have been 
upheld against claims under a number of federal statutes, including the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,24 the Sherman Antitrust 
 
 16. Id. at 485-86. 
 17. Id. at 491.  
 18. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
 19. Id. at 397-98. 
 20. Id. at 402.  
 21. Id. at 404; see also Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006) 
(holding that arbitration agreements are severable from their contracts, and therefore a claim of an illegal 
contract with a valid arbitration clause must still go to arbitration). 
 22. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (“Although all statutory 
claims may not be appropriate for arbitration, having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be 
held to it unless Congress has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the 
statutory rights at issue.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 23. Id. Courts presume arbitration clauses are valid, and the party seeking to void it bears the 
burden to do so. 
 24. See id. at 35. 
4
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss4/8
2019]   EPIC SYSTEMS CORP. V. LEWIS AND TITLE VII CLASS ACTIONS 1171 
Act,25 the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,26 the Truth in Lending Act,27 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,28 the Americans 
with Disabilities Act,29 and—perhaps most critically for purposes of the 
Article—Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.30 Without express 
Congressional approval, the FAA makes arbitration agreements 
enforceable in order to “advance the objective of allowing claimants a 
broader right to select the forum for resolving disputes,” and to give 
parties the ability to trade “the procedures and opportunity for review of 
the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of 
arbitration.”31 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. is illustrative of the Court’s 
deference to arbitration agreements in employment contracts and the 
difficult burden employees bear in voiding them.32 The issue in Gilmer 
was whether a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
of 1967 (“ADEA”) could be subject to arbitration under an arbitration 
agreement in a securities registration application.33 The defendant 
company hired the plaintiff-employee as a financial services professional, 
which required the employee to register with a number of stock 
exchanges.34 This registration process included an application which 
provided that the employee “agreed to arbitrate any dispute, claim, or 
controversy” between him and the company.35 When the employee was 
terminated at age sixty-two, the employee filed an age discrimination 
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) 
and subsequent ADEA claim in federal court.36 
Writing for the majority, Justice White noted the Court’s clear 
jurisprudence, which allowed many claims to be arbitrated despite private 
rights of action provided for in the statutes at issue.37 Justice White argued 
that “by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the 
 
 25. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985). 
 26. See Richardson v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 254 F.3d 1321, 1327-28 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 27. See Pleasants v. Am. Express Co., 541 F.3d 853, 859 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 28. See Mayaja, Inc., S.A. v. Bodkin, 824 F.2d 439, 439-40 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 29. See Siebert v. Amateur Ath. Union of the U.S., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1035 (D. Minn. 
2006). 
 30. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1999); 
see also Sapiro v. VeriSign, 310 F. Supp. 2d 208, 212 (Dist. D.C. 2004); Hughes v. CACI, Inc.—
Commercial, 384 F. Supp. 2d 89, 91 (Dist. D.C. 2005). 
 31. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). 
 32. See generally id. at 29. 
 33. Id. at 23. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628). 
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substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their 
resolution in an arbitral, rather than judicial, forum.”38 Once the parties 
have agreed to arbitrate, the agreement should be valid unless Congress 
has clearly intended to void such agreements for the statutory right at 
issue.39 The burden is on the employee to show such intention—and the 
intention may be found through the statutory text, its legislative history, 
or some inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute’s underlying 
purpose.40  
Justice White held that the employee did not meet this burden, as 
neither the ADEA’s text, history, nor structure was incompatible with 
arbitration.41 Justice White—and the employee—acknowledged that the 
text of the ADEA does not mention arbitration or a requirement for claims 
to be brought in a judicial forum.42 While noting that the ADEA furthers 
important social policies, those policies were not inherently inconsistent 
with arbitration; indeed, claims under many federal statutes are fit for 
arbitration.43 Moreover, by having the EEOC involved in the ADEA’s 
enforcement structure, Justice White found that Congress intended more 
than just judicial action for resolution of ADEA claims.44 Arbitration 
agreements do not prevent administrative action, and do not preclude the 
EEOC “from bringing actions seeking class-wide and equitable relief” on 
behalf of employees—a major policy goal of the ADEA.45 
As Gilmer and other cases illustrate, courts grant broad deference to 
arbitration agreements, and place a significant burden on those seeking to 
void them.  
B. The National Labor Relations Act 
The primary purpose of the National Labor Relations Act was to 
guarantee employees’ rights to act collectively in forming a union against 
state actions prohibiting such collective action.46 To those ends, Section 
7 of the NLRA provides that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage 
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. (citing Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987)). 
 41. Id. at 26-27. 
 42. Id. at 29. 
 43. Id. at 27-28. 
 44. Id. at 28-29. 
 45. Id. at 32. 
 46. Int’l Union, U.A.W.A. v. Wis. Empl. Rel. Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 258 (1949).  
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other mutual aid or protection.”47 While originally interpreted narrowly 
to prohibit private and state action to violently suppress union organizing, 
the NLRA has grown to protect peaceful actions that impact organizing 
efforts as well.48 Thus, the NLRA protects activity not only expressly 
protected by Section 7, but also “when it was an activity that Congress 
intended to be ‘unrestricted by any governmental power to regulate.’”49 
The NLRA therefore seeks to protect employees from hostile employers 
when those employees seek—through union membership or otherwise—
to act collectively for mutual aid or protection.50 
Courts will generally give deference to the National Labor Relations 
Board (“NLRB”) rulings in construing the NLRA’s “concerted activities 
. . . for mutual aid or protection.”51 When the NLRB makes a decision 
interpreting the NLRA, the decision must be upheld unless it is found to 
be “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”52 This 
deference to the NLRB grants the NLRB the responsibility to adapt the 
NLRA to the ever-changing workplace environments and disputes that 
fall within its “special competence.”53 Essentially, when the NLRB 
reaches a “fair and reasoned balance upon a question within its special 
competence, its newly arrived at construction of [Section] 7 does not 
exceed the reach of that section.”54 
Thus, the NLRB assumed considerable authority under the NLRA to 
extend protections to workers’ collective and class action rights, and 
prohibited employers from preempting employees from filing federal 
class and collective actions.55  
In D.R. Horton, Inc.,56 the NLRB considered whether an employer 
violates the NLRA when it requires covered employees to sign an 
arbitration agreement that precluded them from filing class or collective 
action claims addressing wages and hours against the employer.57 There, 
the employer required employees to agree, as a condition of employment, 
 
 47. 29 U.S.C.S. § 157 (LexisNexis 2018) (emphasis added). 
 48. See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aero. Workers v. Wis. Empl. Rel. Comm’n., 427 U.S. 132, 
141 (1976) (“[earlier holdings] that state power is not pre-empted as to peaceful conduct neither protected 
by [the NLRA] nor prohibited . . . [were] undercut by subsequent decisions of this Court.”) 
 49. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960)). 
 50. Yesterday’s Children v. NLRB, 115 F.3d 36, 45 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 51. USPS v. NLRB, 969 F.2d 1064, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing NLRB v. J.Weingarten, Inc., 
420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975)). 
 52. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). 
 53. J.Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 266-67 (finding that the NLRB did not abuse its discretion when it 
upheld the presence of union representatives in employee-disciplinary meetings despite no express grant 
of authority to do so under Section 7) (internal citations omitted). 
 54. Id. at 267. 
 55. See D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2277-78 (2012). 
 56. This was an administrative law case, heard by the NLRB. 
 57. D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2277. 
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that “they [would] not pursue class or collective litigation of claims in any 
forum, arbitral or judicial,” instead requiring the disputes to be resolved 
individually.58 The NLRB struck down the arbitration agreement, holding 
that employers violated employees’ Section 7 rights by requiring 
employees to waive the right to pursue any claim as a collective or class 
action in any forum.59 The NLRB first reasoned that pursing a claim as a 
collective does fall within the rights protected under Section 7’s broad 
“other concerted activities” language.60 Moreover, the NLRB found that 
no conflict existed between the NLRA and the FAA where collective 
claims are completely barred by the arbitration agreement since the FAA 
requires arbitration only so long as the parties’ substantive rights under 
other federal statutes are still protected.61 Since the NLRB found 
collective and class action to be substantively protected action under 
federal statute, and that the arbitration agreement at issue to completely 
bar access to any form of that action, the NLRB held class and collective 
action waivers to all forums invalid.62 
Since the NLRA protects employees’ rights to act collectively, the 
NLRB found that the NLRA includes some opportunity to pursue 
employment remedies through class and collective litigation.63 The 
ensuing circuit split surrounding the NLRA’s effect on class waivers in 
employment agreements found its way to the Supreme Court in the spring 
term of 2018.64  
C. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196465 
By enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, “Congress 
intended to prohibit all practices in whatever form which create inequality 
in employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of race, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”66 Title VII seeks to “make persons whole 
for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment 
discrimination.”67 To those ends, Title VII provides several enforcement 
 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 2288. 
 60. Id. at 2278 (quoting Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565-566 (1978)) (“Section 7 ‘protects 
employees from retaliation by their employer when they seek to improve their working conditions through 
resort to administrative and judicial forums.’”).  
 61. Id. at 2284-85 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)). 
 62. Id. at 2288. 
 63. See id.  
 64. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 137 S.Ct. 809 (2017) (certiorari granted). 
 65. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e et al (LexisNexis 2018).  
 66. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (citing Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974)). 
 67. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975). 
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mechanisms to aggrieved employees. First, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) may investigate allegations of 
employment discrimination and, if such allegations are true, “shall 
endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by 
informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.”68 Second, 
if the EEOC is unable to secure a resolution with an employer, the EEOC 
may file a civil suit in federal court, and the Attorney General may bring 
such a suit against a government employer.69 Third, Title VII grants 
individuals a private right of action should the EEOC dismiss a filed 
charge or not resolve a filed charge within the statutory reference period.70  
In addition to outlawing intentional or overt employment 
discrimination, Title VII also prohibits employment practices that are 
discriminatory in consequence, if not in form. Through Title VII, 
Congress intended to focus on the consequences of employment policies, 
not just employer motivations.71 This disparate impact theory permits 
challenges to employment practices that cause a disparate impact on the 
basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin, and that are not related to 
the position in question or a business necessity.72 This type of claim “is 
primarily intended to lighten the [employee’s] heavy burden of proving 
intentional discrimination after employers learned to cover their tracks.”73 
Instead of having to prove the employer had a discriminatory state of 
mind, employees can show that the employer’s practices had a 
discriminatory impact, regardless of the employer’s motives.74 
Disparate impact claims were initially a judicially-created evidentiary 
standard.75 In a landmark 1971 decision, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the 
Court held that Title VII “proscribes not only overt discrimination but 
also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”76 
Noting that employers, in response to Title VII’s introduction in 1964, 
began implementing facially neutral policies that discriminated in 
practice, the Court allowed employees to challenge such policies if the 
employees made a showing that the policy bears no reasonable 
 
 68. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-5(b) (LexisNexis 2018). 
 69. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
 70. Id.  
 71. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (finding an employer is prohibited under 
Title VII from requiring a standardized intelligence test as a condition of employment when there was no 
discernable relationship between performance and employment success and the test operated to disqualify 
people of color at a substantially higher rate than white employees). 
 72. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (LexisNexis 2018). 
 73. Lewis v. City of Chicago, Ill., 560 U.S. 205, 215 (2010) (quoting Lewis v. City of Chicago, 
528 F.3d 488, 491-92 (7th Cir. 2008)). 
 74. Id. at 217. 
 75. See generally Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424. 
 76. Id. at 431. 
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relationship to the job.77 
Congress confirmed the legitimacy of disparate impact claims with the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, which added several provisions to Title VII—
notably, the circumstances in which disparate impact claims may be 
available and proven.78 These amendments provide that employees may 
make a prima facie case by showing a defendant makes use of a policy 
that has a disparate impact on a class protected under Title VII.79 Once 
this showing is made, the employer has the burden to prove that the 
practice is job related for the position in question.80 
After the 1991 amendments, there was some question as to the 
applicability of class actions for Title VII claims, and also whether 
arbitration agreements were viable for individual claims given the 
expanded specificity of private employee actions in the amendments.81 In 
addition to adding a statutory method of proof for disparate impact, the 
1991 amendments also included a right to a jury trial for Title VII claims, 
as well as punitive damages for successful claims.82 Some courts were 
hesitant to find common, class-wide remedies to employment 
discrimination class actions when punitive damages might require more 
individualized fact-finding.83 The right to a jury trial—as opposed to a 
bench trial prior to the 1991 amendments—cast some doubt upon the 
validity of arbitration agreements after the 1991 amendments.84 In 
particular, the Ninth Circuit held that arbitration could not be compelled 
for individual Title VII claims after the 1991 amendments.85 In a separate 
case, the Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit and held that the 
 
 77. Id. at 428 (prior to the passage of Title VII, the defendant employer openly discriminated 
against job applicants on the basis of race, and then added an aptitude test requirement on the very day 
that Title VII became effective; the job in question was for low-level positions at a coal-fired power plant). 
 78. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2 (LexisNexis 2018); see also 2 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON ON 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 20.01 (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 2018), LexisNexis (2018). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 
813, 814 (2004); see also 4 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 77.02 
(Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 2018), LexisNexis (2018) (explaining that until the Supreme Court 
ruled otherwise, some federal courts began invalidating arbitration agreements for Title VII claims). 
 82. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1981a(c)(1); see also Hart, supra note 81, at 821 (“Both the additional damages 
provisions and the jury trial right have led courts and numerous commentators to debate about the 
continued viability of class litigation in claims alleging intentional discrimination.”). 
 83. See Hart, supra note 81 at 826 (finding the Fifth Circuit to be most hostile to Title VII class 
actions after the 1991 amendments).  
 84. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st. Cir. 1999) 
(upholding the district courts denial of motion to compel arbitration, but on grounds separate from the 
district court. The district court denied employer’s motion on the ground that the 1991 amendments do 
not allow arbitration of discrimination claims; the First Circuit—while agreeing to deny arbitration in that 
particular case—held, “as a matter of law that application of pre-dispute arbitration agreements to federal 
claims arising under Title VII . . . is not precluded” by the 1991 amendments). 
 85. Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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1991 amendments encourage, rather than prohibit, arbitration.86 The 
Ninth Circuit later reversed its position in a 2003 en banc opinion, 
bringing all circuit courts into agreement that the 1991 amendments do 
not prohibit arbitration of Title VII claims.87 
Normally, disparate impact claims are brought as class actions, which 
subject that aspect of the claim to all requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23.88 
In such cases, the plaintiff will generally bear the burden of providing 
some evidence to show an inference that an employment decision was 
based on an illegal discriminatory criterion under Title VII.89 While 
individual discrimination claims may be subject to a formal framework 
discussed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green90 and its progeny, 
disparate impact claims are different. In disparate impact class actions, 
plaintiff-employees may make a prima facie case of discrimination by 
demonstrating the “existence of a discriminatory hiring pattern or 
practice,” which may create a reasonable inference that individual class 
members were subject to discriminatory hiring decisions.91 Under this 
framework, employers may then rebut the presumption that individual 
plaintiffs were negatively impacted by the pattern-or-practice at issue.92 
Evidence of a disparate impact may be supplemented by the impact on 
individual class plaintiffs.93  
Despite disparate impact claims normally being litigated as class 
actions, they are also brought as individual claims.94 However, many 
courts prohibit individuals from bringing pattern-or-practice claims when 
seeking equitable relief; rather, individuals may use an employer’s 
practices as evidence in support of a disparate impact theory of 
recovery.95 Without alleging a disparate impact on the individual, 
 
 86. Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001). 
 87. EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 744-45 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 88. See E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 401 (1977) (finding plaintiffs 
were not proper class representatives in a disparate impact class action). 
 89. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 358-59 (1977) (citing McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)). 
 90. 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973) (finding that individual plaintiff-employees must first show a prima 
facie case of discrimination, which creates a presumption that employers may rebut with a legitimate 
reason for its conduct, which plaintiff-employees may then rebut by showing the proffered reason is 
merely a cover for actual discrimination).  
 91. Teamsters, 431 U.S. 358-59 (citing Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 748 
(1976)). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.  
 94. See Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972) (finding that individual 
employee may bring a disparate impact Title VII claim for damages, but that prospective equitable relief 
is inappropriate when the claim is not brought as a class action and the prospective relief would benefit 
nonparties). 
 95. See Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y & N.J., 685 F.3d 135, 146-50 (2d Cir. 2012) (distinguishing 
Title VII’s express pattern-or-practice right of action granted to the Attorney General from disparate 
11
Miller: Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis and Title VII Class Actions
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019
1178 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87 
individual employees are generally not able to recover by merely alleging 
an employer’s pattern-or-practice exists without more; pattern-or-practice 
evidence as a prima facie case of a disparate impact claim is reserved for 
the class-context.96 
In short, Title VII allows employees to bring claims against their 
employers for both intentional discrimination and facially neutral 
employment practices that have a disparate and discriminatory impact in 
violation of the law. Claims brought as disparate impact and pattern-or-
practice claims are frequently, though not exclusively, litigated as class 
action lawsuits.  
D. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis97 
1. Background 
After the NLRB nullified the arbitration provision in D.R. Horton, a 
circuit split developed between circuits that either (1) agreed with the 
NLRB’s decision to void class action waivers; (2) deferred to the NLRB 
in interpreting the NLRA’s reach, thus upholding the NLRB’s decision; 
or (3) disagreed with the NLRB and upheld class action waivers.98 The 
Seventh Circuit agreed with the NLRB, holding that waivers of any class-
based claim for wage and hour claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(either in a judicial or arbitral forum) violated the NLRA and was also 
unenforceable under Section 2 of the FAA.99 Months later, the Ninth 
Circuit reached the same conclusion on a nearly identical case.100  
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit found that requiring employees to 
“relinquish their right to pursue class or collective claims in all forums” 
does not constitute an unfair labor practice.101 In that case, Murphy Oil 
USA, Inc. v. NLRB, the employer revised a previously-struck class-waiver 
agreement to include express notice that employees could still bring 
individual claims outside of arbitration directly to the NLRB.102 The Fifth 
Circuit found the additional notice under the revised class waiver to 
 
impact class action litigation) (“A pattern or practice case is not a separate and free-standing cause of 
action . . . , but is really merely another method by which disparate treatment can be shown”). 
 96. See id. 
 97. 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018). 
 98. Id. at 1619. 
 99. Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 100. See Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 989-90 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The NLRA 
establishes a core right to concerted activity. Irrespective of the forum in which disputes are resolved, 
employees must be able to act in the forum together. . . Arbitration, like any other forum for resolving 
disputes, cannot be structured so as to exclude all concerted employee legal claims.”). 
 101. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013, 1018 (5th Cir. 2015).  
 102. Id. at 1020. 
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sufficiently clarify the employee’s rights under the NLRA such that 
employees would no longer interpret the agreement to prohibit filing of 
individual unfair labor-practices charges.103 The Supreme Court 
consolidated the appeals and granted certiorari.104 
2. Justice Gorsuch’s Majority Opinion 
Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Gorsuch found that the NLRA 
secures employees’ rights to “organize unions and bargain collectively, 
but it says nothing about how judges and arbitrators must try legal 
disputes that leave the workplace and enter the courtroom or arbitral 
forum.”105 Moreover, Justice Gorsuch refused to read a right to class 
actions into Section 7 of the NLRA, and took specific issue with the 
NLRB’s decision in D.R. Horton.106  
Justice Gorsuch began with Congress’s intent in enacting the FAA—
“to abandon [judicial] hostility and instead treat arbitration agreements as 
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”107 By requiring courts to respect and 
enforce arbitration agreements, Congress also instructed courts to enforce 
the parties’ contractually chosen arbitration procedures, except for 
reasons that exist to void any contract.108 Opponents of the FAA may find 
this broad deference to private, contractual arbitration agreements to be 
bad policy, but the FAA still applies.109 
While the employees suggest that Section 7 of the NLRA provides an 
argument to void the arbitration agreement, Justice Gorsuch found the 
NLRA did not provide any plain-meaning support for the proposition, let 
alone a substantive legal right that would provide grounds to void the 
agreement under Section 2 of the FAA.110 Even if the NLRA provided a 
substantive right to class and collective action, the FAA only provides 
exceptions for defenses that apply to any contract, such as fraud, duress, 
or unconscionability.111 Since the employees did not argue that their 
arbitration agreements were signed under fraud or duress—and instead 
argue that the agreements require individualized rather than collective 
action—the agreements could not be excepted under Section 2 of the 
FAA.112  
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 137 S.Ct. 809 (2017) (certiorari granted). 
 105. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018). 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 1621 (internal quotations omitted). 
 108. Id. at 1621-22. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 1622. 
 111. Id. (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011)). 
 112. Id.  
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Furthermore, arguments that a separate federal statute requires courts 
to void an otherwise valid arbitration agreement “face a stout uphill 
climb.”113 While noting that the Court should try to give effect to both the 
FAA and the NLRA, Justice Gorsuch admonished the employees that 
they have a heavy burden of showing a “clearly expressed congressional 
intention” that the NLRA should displace the FAA.114 Further, the Court 
has a strong presumption against “repeals by implication,” and generally 
considers that Congress will expressly address a preexisting statute in a 
later one if it wants to amend the normal operation of the preexisting 
statute.115 
After recognizing that burden, Justice Gorsuch found that Section 7 of 
the NLRA does not meet the necessary standard to preclude the FAA’s 
operation on the contract at issue. First, Section 7 does not contain any 
express mention of arbitration, class or collective action procedures; it 
focuses on the right to organize unions and to collectively bargain.116 
Class and collective action procedures were not codified by Rule 23 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure until more than thirty years after the 
NLRA’s passage.117 And, while Section 7 includes “other concerted 
activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection,” that clause is 
contained within a list under the general topic of union organizing.118 
Moreover, the Court has heard and rejected efforts to override arbitration 
agreements dealing with a number of federal statutes—including class 
action waivers and statutes providing for collective legal actions.119 
Turning to the employees’ argument that Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
NRDC, Inc.,120 requires courts to defer to administrative agencies, Justice 
Gorsuch found the NLRB overreached its administrative role by 
interpreting not just the NLRA, but also the FAA when the NLRB decided 
D.R. Horton.121 Agencies may seek to advance their own statutory 
mission at the expense of the competing statute; conflicting statutes 
require a judicial decision.122 Only where a court finds ambiguity while 
 
 113. Id. at 1623-24. 
 114. Id. at 1624 (quoting Vimar Seguros y Reaseguors, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 533 
(1995)). 
 115. Id. (citing United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 452-53 (1988) (overruled on separate 
grounds)). 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. at 1624-25. 
 118. Id. at 1625 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018)). 
 119. Id. at 1627 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991)). 
 120. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (standing for the proposition that administrative agencies deserve 
deference from courts when interpreting statutes the agencies are tasked with enforcing; the details of 
Chevron are not particularly relevant to the discussion at issue here, yet in this instance shows hostility 
for agencies interpreting and voiding the FAA). 
 121. Epic Sys., 138 S.Ct. at 1629. 
 122. Id. (citing Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659, 685-86 (1975)). 
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using traditional methods of statutory interpretation should an 
administrative agency receive judicial deference.123 Thus, Justice 
Gorsuch found that the NLRB incorrectly interpreted Section 7 of the 
NLRA to void class and collective action waivers in contradiction to the 
FAA.124 
3. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent and Exception for Title VII Disparate 
Impact Class Actions. 
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg took exception to the idea that the NLRA 
exists only for purposes of union organizing. She stated that “employees 
have a fundamental right to join together to advance their common 
interests and that Congress, in lieu of ignoring that right, had elected to 
safeguard it.”125 Justice Ginsburg noted the broad language of Section 7’s 
“other concerted activities,” as well as the broad ability to the NLRB to 
interpret the NLRA to account for changing industrial and economic 
conditions.126 The majority’s use of the ejusdem generis cannon127 
confusingly narrows the scope of the NLRA; collective litigation clearly 
fits within “other concerted activities” in the collective employment 
sphere.128 The NLRB’s continuing expansion of activities protected by 
the NLRA without Congressional interference should be evidence that the 
NLRA does not provide for specific regulatory guidance so as to exclude 
collective litigation from the NLRA’s protection.129 Justice Ginsburg also 
criticized what she sees as the Court’s decisions that have expanded the 
scope of the FAA away from an original “intent simply to afford 
merchants a speedy and economical means of resolving commercial 
disputes.”130 Because Justice Ginsburg would hold that Section 7 provides 
a right to collective litigation, and illegality is a common-law contract 
defense, Section 2 of the FAA should invalidate collective action 
 
 123. Id. at 1630 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843). 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 1635 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 
1, 33-34 (1937)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 126. Id. at 1637 (quoting Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565 (1978) (“‘The 74th Congress’, 
this Court has noted, ‘knew well enough that labor’s cause often is advanced on fronts other than collective 
bargaining and grievance settlement within the immediate employment context.’” ). 
 127. A clause appearing at the end of a detailed list should be read to embrace only activities similar 
in nature. 
 128. Id. at 1638. 
 129. Id. at 1639. 
 130. See id. at 1643-45 (“It is, therefore, this Court’s exorbitant application of the FAA—stretching 
it far beyond contractual disputes between merchants—that led the NLRB to confront . . . the precise 
question whether employers can use arbitration agreements to insulate themselves from collective 
employment litigation.”). 
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waivers.131 
Justice Ginsburg concluded with the following exception to the 
majority opinion: 
 
In stark contrast to today’s decision, the Court has repeatedly 
recognized the centrality of group action to the effective 
enforcement of antidiscrimination statutes. With Court approbation, 
concerted legal actions have played a critical role in enforcing 
prohibitions against workplace discrimination based on race, sex, 
and other protected characteristics. In this context, the Court has 
comprehended that government entities charged with enforcing 
antidiscrimination statutes are unlikely to be funded at levels that 
could even begin to compensate for a significant dropoff in private 
enforcement efforts. That reality, as just noted, holds true for 
enforcement of wage and hour laws. I do not read the Court’s 
opinion to place in jeopardy discrimination complaints asserting 
disparate-impact and pattern-or-practice claims that call for proof 
on a groupwide basis . . . which some courts have concluded cannot 
be maintained by solo complaints. It would be grossly exorbitant to 
read the FAA to devastate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and other laws enacted to eliminate, root and branch, class-based 
employment discrimination[.]132 
 
Essentially, Justice Ginsburg asserts that even if the majority opinion 
correctly resolves the statutory interpretation dispute between the FAA 
and the NLRA, collective actions using pattern-or-practice or disparate 
impact claims under Title VII may not be voided by individual arbitration 
agreements.133 
III. DISCUSSION 
When the Court decided Epic Systems, it expanded more than three 
decades of pro-arbitration jurisprudence to overturn the NLRB’s working 
interpretation of the NLRA.134 While the actual merits of this decision 
may be debated, its significance to the applicability and enforceability of 
arbitration agreements and class waivers cannot be understated. And 
while the decision may be read narrowly—especially given the questions 
 
 131. Id. at 1645. 
 132. Id. at 1648 (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 133. See id.  
 134. See e.g. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991); see also Leading 
Case, Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 132 HARV. L. REV. 427, 427-28 (2018) (“[Epic Systems] is a vivid 
illustration of the declining power of workers in the U.S. political system.”).  
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surrounding the relationship of the parties’ underlying cause of action to 
the plain language of the NLRA—many of the same characteristics of the 
NLRA that led the Court to uphold a class wavier in the face of claims 
under the NLRA also exist under Title VII’s plain language. 
This section will argue that Epic Systems will be applied to Title VII 
disparate impact and pattern-or-practice class action claims if a valid class 
wavier exists, upholding a class waiver against a claim seeking to void it. 
After an evaluation of the similarities and differences between potential 
claims under the NLRA and a potential Title VII claim, this section will 
conclude with an evaluation of class-waivers for Title VII claims under 
Epic Systems’ analytical framework for implied congressional intent to 
void arbitration agreements. Finally, this section will examine Justice 
Ginsburg’s argument and outline a possible challenge to the Epic Systems 
decision. Regardless of the merits of Epic Systems, the jurisprudence has 
reached the point to be so extensive as to require congressional action 
should Congress desire to limit the applicability of class waivers. 
A. Title VII—similar to the NLRA—is silent on arbitration and the FAA, 
and must be considered under Epic Systems. 
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion focused on three major characteristics when 
searching for a reason to void a class-waiver—and thus supersede the 
FAA—through another federal statute: (1) express discussion in the 
statute of arbitration, or intent to override the FAA; (2) a substantive legal 
right to class or collective action, granted in the statute; or (3) grounds 
within the FAA to void the class waiver.135 At issue in Epic Systems—
whether class action waivers are per se void under the NLRA—is a statute 
that fails to meet all three of these markers. Similarly, the NLRA fails to 
meet these markers as it does not mention arbitration, does not grant an 
express right to a class or collective legal action, and the arbitration 
agreement at issue likely is not voidable on common-law contract 
grounds.136  
The plain language of Title VII is similarly silent on these issues 
critical to the Court’s reasoning in Epic Systems. Title VII does not 
mention arbitration or class action waivers—neither in its prohibited acts 
sections nor in its enforcement procedures sections.137 The FAA is not 
mentioned in Title VII.138 Additionally, while Title VII provides several 
remedies for employer violations—including EEOC enforcement, 
 
 135. See Epic Sys., 138 S.Ct. at 1624 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 136. Or under the NLRA, assuming the NLRA covers employment action outside of collective 
bargaining activities. 
 137. See 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 2000e-2-2000e-6 (LexisNexis 2018). 
 138. §§ 2000e-2-2000e-6 (LexisNexis). 
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litigation by the Attorney General, and a private right of action to 
individual employees—it does not provide for a specific right to class or 
collective action in its remedies.139 All of this is to say that there is little 
in the plain language of Title VII that would distinguish it from the NLRA 
when it comes to arbitration agreements—and would likely subject a 
challenge to an arbitration agreement under Title VII to the same kind of 
analysis that the Court evaluated the NLRA in Epic Systems.  
Furthermore, the Epic Systems opinion is so broadly stated that courts 
would have to strain to not apply it: “[j]ust as judicial antagonism toward 
arbitration before the Arbitration Act’s enactment manifested itself in a 
great variety of devices and formulas declaring arbitration against public 
policy . . . we must be alert to new devices and formulas that would 
achieve much the same result today. [A] rule seeking to declare 
individualized arbitration proceedings off limits is . . . just such a 
device.”140 The Court has declared a strong suspicion of any doctrine that 
overrides an otherwise valid class waiver, and Title VII disparate impact 
claims are likely not an exception. 
Some clear distinctions exist—employment policies with a disparate, 
discriminatory impact are expressly outlawed under Title VII, and 
individuals are expressly granted a private right of action, unlike under 
the NLRA.141 Yet the absence of any text on arbitration or outside 
employment agreements, coupled with an extensive history of arbitrating 
other Title VII claims, gives little room to argue that Epic Systems is not 
the current law to apply to any challenge to an arbitration agreement. 
B. A claim to void a class-waiver under Title VII does not meet Epic 
Systems’ strict standard for implied intent to override the FAA. 
As mentioned above, the Court views implied challenges to the FAA 
with deep suspicion.142 The Court looks to several factors. As an initial 
matter, when “confronted with two Acts of Congress allegedly touching 
on [arbitration agreements], this Court is not at ‘liberty to pick and choose 
among congressional enactments’ and must instead strive ‘to give effect 
to both.’”143 The party seeking to void the FAA must find a “clearly 
expressed congressional intention” to do so.144 The intention must be 
 
 139. §§ 2000e-2-2000e-6 (LexisNexis). 
 140. Epic Sys., 138 S.Ct. at 1623 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 342 
(2011)). 
 141. See § 2000e-2(k); see also § 2000e-5. 
 142. Epic Sys., 138 S.Ct. at 1624. 
 143. Id. (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551(1974) (finding an implied repeal of a 
federal hiring preference statute did not occur when Congress made no affirmative showing to repeal the 
older statute under a subsequent statute)). 
 144. Id. (quoting Vimar Seguros y Reaseguors, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 533 (1995) 
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“clear and manifest.”145 Further, courts should have a strong presumption 
against repeals by implication and assume that Congress will specifically 
address the FAA should it wish to suspend its operation under a later 
statute.146  
The factors derived from the above principles—which the Court relied 
upon—are also instructive: (1) whether the statute expresses approval or 
disapproval of arbitration; (2) whether the statute discusses class or 
collective action procedures; and (3) whether there is any hint, either 
express or by implication, of a desire to suspend the FAA.147 In addition, 
if there is to be an implied exception, the claim to void the arbitration 
agreement should have some basis in a substantive right protected in the 
subsequent statute.148 
Title VII does not carry Epic Systems’ high burden to void arbitration 
agreements in the absence of explicit statutory instruction to do so. Like 
the NLRA, there is neither approval nor disapproval of arbitration in Title 
VII’s text.149 Like the NLRA, several remedies are provided—including 
an extensive discussion of a private right of action—but class or collective 
action are not mentioned as potential remedies or substantive rights under 
the statute. Without any discussion of arbitration agreements or a clear 
intent to discuss them, Title VII does not hint at a wish to void class 
waivers, let alone to do so “clearly and manifestly” as the Court has 
demanded. 150  
While there is a discussion of disparate impact in Title VII, it is not in 
the remedies section of the statute.151 The only place where disparate 
impact or pattern-or-practice is discussed as a remedy on its own is in the 
Attorney General’s enforcement powers—the unlawful employment 
practice section discusses a method of proof, not necessarily a discussion 
of how such an action can or should be brought.152 For instance, Title VII 
specifically grants the Attorney General the right to bring a civil suit when 
the Attorney General “has reasonable cause to believe that any person or 
group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the 
full enjoyment of any of the rights secured” by Title VII.153 In contrast, 
 
(upholding arbitration in face of challenge under the Carriage of Goods By Sea Act)). 
 145. Id. (quoting Morton, 417 U.S. at 551). 
 146. Id. (citing United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 452 (1988)). 
 147. See id. at 1625-26. 
 148. See id. at 1626 (“Still another contextual clue yields the same message. The employees’ 
underlying causes of action involve their wages and arise not under the NLRA but under an entirely 
different statute, the Fair Labor Standards Act.”). 
 149. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-5 (LexisNexis 2018). 
 150. See Epic Sys., 138 S.Ct. at 1624.  
 151. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-5(f) (granting private right of action and enforcement by the EEOC). 
 152. § 2000e-2; § 2000e-6. 
 153. § 2000e-6 (this reference to pattern-or-practice is a general reference to employers’ practices 
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the enforcement provisions outlining private actions do not mention 
pattern-or-practice, or disparate impact claims as specific enforcement 
mechanisms.154  
C. Justice Ginsburg’s contention that pattern-or-practice and disparate 
impact class actions are unaffected by arbitration agreements fails to 
offer a substantive reason for the claims’ exclusion. 
As discussed above, Justice Ginsburg stresses that Epic Systems should 
not apply to Title VII pattern-or-practice and disparate impact class action 
cases even if Epic Systems was otherwise correctly decided. This 
argument hinges on three factors: (1) Title VII granted pattern-or-practice 
and disparate impact class actions as substantive rights that must be 
available to any plaintiff who can make such claims; (2) such claims are 
unavailable to plaintiffs outside of the class action; and (3) the elimination 
of the pattern-or-practice and disparate impact class action results in a 
devastation of Title VII’s ultimate purpose. Following this argument, the 
FAA must be superseded in these claims because the arbitration 
agreement unlawfully restricts a substantive right provided by federal 
law.  
Two possible sources support Justice Ginsburg’s assertion of a 
substantive right to a class action under a pattern-or-practice/disparate 
impact claim: the enumeration of proving disparate impact within the text 
of Title VII’s prohibited employment practices,155 and legislative intent 
for litigation of these claims through a private right of action and the well-
established class action mechanism. Indeed, in Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co.,156 the Court noted, “Congress provided, in Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, for class actions for enforcement of provisions of the 
Act.”157 Through this ban of disparate impact practices, and the 
development of a pattern-or-practice class action, Justice Ginsburg finds 
a substantive right to bring these claims. 
Further, these claims on their own, brought by individual plaintiffs 
outside of a class action, are not allowed in some courts. Justice Ginsburg 
pointed to Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., in which individual plaintiffs 
could not bring a pattern-or-practice claim—standing alone—outside of 
a class action.158 By denying plaintiffs, as individuals, from seeking a 
 
in violation of Title VII, and indeed mentions actions where the employer intends to discriminate; this is 
distinct from the per se finding of discrimination in a disparate impact claim, where intent is irrelevant to 
the finding of discrimination). 
 154. See § 2000e-5. 
 155. See § 2000e-2. 
 156. 401 U.S. 424, 424 (1971). 
 157. 401 U.S. at 426. 
 158. 685 F.3d at 147. 
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legal remedy available to others wholesale through a class waiver, the 
FAA should not apply to such claims. 
This line of reasoning considers the elimination of pattern-or-practice 
class actions through private contract so antithetical to the very purpose 
of Title VII that it should not be allowed to stand. Noting the Court’s 
broad interpretation of Title VII’s intent—and mission to root out all 
forms of class-based employment discrimination—the use of an 
arbitration agreement to neutralize one of the employees’ greatest 
weapons against individual discrimination cannot be upheld.159 Indeed, 
one of the main prongs of Epic Systems’ predecessor case, Gilmer, was 
for arbitration agreements to be overruled when the agreement is 
antithetical to the purpose of the statute, even if that statue does not 
explicitly mention arbitration or the FAA.160 Epic Systems largely ignores 
this major prong of prior arbitration jurisprudence, in favor of a cursory 
glance at the plain text of the statute.161 
Yet this argument flounders at each point; pattern-or-practice claims 
are not mentioned as private rights of action or in a class action context.162 
While disparate impact employment policies are outlawed, a disparate 
impact claim is merely a method of proof. The Court noted as much in 
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., finding that pattern-or-practice in 
the class context was a common question of fact in the class certification 
analysis, and using it as an application of individual Title VII burden-
shifting.163 Even if pattern-or-practice claims are substantive rights under 
Title VII, using pattern-or-practice evidence is not necessarily precluded 
by arbitration or in an individual setting. Proof that an employer engaged 
in discriminatory pattern-or-practice may be relevant evidence to an 
individual’s case, and offering that evidence is not precluded outside of 
the class setting, even if that employee cannot make a prima facie Title 
VII discrimination case exclusively out of that evidence.164 
Further, even if an arbitration agreement precludes class action—and 
therefore makes it harder for individual plaintiffs to bring a disparate 
impact claim—Title VII contains other remedies for the same problem.165 
Namely, employees can still file with the EEOC, who can then bring an 
administrative action against the employer, or the Attorney General may 
 
 159. This final, intent point in Justice Ginsburg’s argument relies heavily upon the Court’s decision 
in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975), which focused largely on the broad ability 
of judges to fashion equitable remedies under Title VII. 
 160. See 500 U.S. at 26. 
 161. See Leading Case, supra note 134 at 435 (“But the omissions do affect the tone of the opinion, 
and suggest a lack of sympathy for workers.”). 
 162. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (LexisNexis 2018). 
 163. See 424 U.S. 747, 773 (1976). 
 164. Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y & N.J., 685 F.3d 135, 149 (2nd Cir. 2012). 
 165. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-5 (LexisNexis 2018); § 2000e-6. 
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bring a disparate impact claim against the employer.166 While arbitration 
and class waivers may limit an individual’s options, the substantive right 
for disparate impact claims—if there is one—still exists through other 
remedies and all that is limited is the judicial forum.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
While Epic Systems directly upheld class waivers under the NLRA, its 
broad language likely applies to other federal statutes, such as Title VII. 
This raises the issue of whether such waivers—which in some jurisdiction 
may eliminate the disparate impact method of proof for private actions—
may be voided as an unlawful limitation of available remedies. Though 
Title VII class waivers bear a closer resemblance to the actual cause of 
action than the employees in Epic Systems, the majority’s reliance on 
plain language and clear Congressional intent to override the FAA make 
such waivers likely applicable to disparate impact claims. 
The strongest argument for suspending the class waivers for disparate 
impact claims—that the disparate impact method of proof is a substantive 
right under the statute and is otherwise unavailable—falls short under this 
analysis because of (1) the absence of any discussion of disparate impact 
claims within Title VII’s remedies; and (2) the availability of disparate 
impact enforcement through the EEOC and Attorney General, regardless 
of whether the individual employee must bring private claims through 
individual arbitration. 
District courts have already expanded Epic Systems to begin covering 
Title VII class waivers.167 Regardless of whether there is a substantive 
right to bring a disparate impact claim, there is no debate as to the extent 
of the nearly three decades of jurisprudence liberally applying the FAA 
to any number of federal statutes.168 Indeed, Justice Ginsburg noted as 
much, although she vehemently disagreed with those cases.169 
Going forward, Epic Systems clearly gives employers cover to include 
increasingly broad waivers of the judicial forum within their employee 
contracts—and many are likely to do so. For employees, individual 
arbitration does not come with many of the benefits of a disparate impact 
class action, including the ability to change an arguably discriminatory 
employment practice through a single action, with limited time 
 
 166. § 2000e-5; § 2000e-6.  
 167. See, e.g., Williams v. Dearborn Motors 1, LLC, Case No. 17-12724, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
137825, *1, *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2018) (citing Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018)) 
(“Although Title VII . . . authorize[s] class or collective actions . . . the statutes allow parties to contract 
for individual bilateral arbitration because the statutes do not make collective or class action procedures 
mandatory”). 
 168. See Epic Sys., 138 S.Ct. at 1618. 
 169. Id. at 1643-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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commitment to litigate. By requiring individual employees to arbitrate 
each claim they have, employees must take the time and energy to bring 
their individual claims against their employer—not a small cost for hourly 
workers.  
All of this is to say that, regardless of the relative merits of class 
waivers and arbitration agreements, the Court has shown an ever-
increasing acceptance of such alternative dispute resolution, even in the 
face of conflict from statutory rights, which any number of renowned 
legal minds have found to be substantive. Epic Systems takes that 
jurisprudence and narrows the margin even further: without statutory 
language explicitly discussing an intent to override the FAA, courts will 
not override an arbitration agreement. With that as the going standard, 
Congress needs to address the issue should it want to limit the 
effectiveness of class waivers going forward. 
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